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ISSUE: Many legal scholars and defense attorneys appearing before the IHT have argued that,
under relevant principles of international law, a state cannot recognize the consequences of an
illegal action. They allege that, because the invasion of Iraq violated article 2(4) of the UN
Charter and violated jus cogens norms outlawing aggressive war, all consequences from this
invasion are illegal—including the establishment of the IHT. Please discuss the contours of
these principles as they apply to the IHT and discuss whether they have any relevancy to the
IHT’s legitimacy.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue1
The team of lawyers defending Saddam Hussein before the Iraqi High Tribunal (“IHT”)
has raised many jurisdictional objections in an effort to cast a shadow on the newly established
Iraqi legal process. One such objection is that the United States (U.S.) led an invasion of Iraq
that was illegal under international law, and anything which is a direct or proximate outflow of
such an act is also illegal. It is contended, then, that the IHT exists through a “but for”
relationship with the Iraq War, where “but for” the Iraq War there would be no IHT. The
defense then argues that the IHT is illegal and must be shut down because of its direct tie to an
illegal action.
After first discussing both the factual contours that led to the Iraq War and the details of
the defense team’s argument of illegality, this memorandum will then argue that the Iraq War
was a legal and permissible action, followed by an argument that even accepting, arguendo, the
defense arguments, the IHT is still a valid enterprise for three reasons: (1) all charges being
brought against Saddam Hussein pertain to violations that occurred prior to the war, and as the
illegality of such actions persisted long before both the war and the establishment of the IHT,
objections rooted in details of the Iraq War are moot; (2) claims of defects in the establishment
of tribunals have never been held to make the entire tribunal illegal; and (3) there is a disconnect
between the IHT and the Iraq War because the IHT cannot be seen as illegal “spoils of war”

1

Many legal scholars and defense attorneys appearing before the IHT have argued that, under relevant principles of
international law, a state cannot recognize the consequences of an illegal action. They allege that, because the
invasion of Iraq violated article 2(4) of the UN Charter and violated jus cogens norms outlawing aggressive war, all
consequences from this invasion are illegal—including the establishment of the IHT. Please discuss the contours of
these principles as they apply to the IHT and discuss whether they have any relevancy to the IHT’s legitimacy.
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when the war powers are not the ones with the “spoils,” but rather the Iraqi people are operating
the IHT.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1) The Iraq War was a Legal Enterprise.
Under principles of preemptive self-defense, the U.S.-led coalition was fully within its
legal right to militarily engage in Iraq. Further, under the panoply of Security Council
Resolutions that had been repeatedly violated by Iraq, the Iraqi government was in “material
breach” and, as such, the international community was duty-bound to coerce compliance.
2) The Connection Between the Iraq War and the Iraqi High Tribunal is
Improper.
Even if the Iraq War were to be found illegal, such a holding fails to impact the validity
of the IHT due to a lack of connection. First, the IHT is not a “consequence of an illegal action”
or “spoils of war,” because the warring power (the U.S.-led coalition) is a different entity than
those operating the IHT. Secondly, if there is found to be a connection between the U.S.-led war
and the IHT, then, under the “laws of occupation,” it can be argued that the U.S.-led coalition
had a duty to create a judicial body in the occupied country.
3) The Legality of the Iraq War is a Moot Point.
Under the international law doctrine of efficient breach, an infraction into another
nation’s territorial sovereignty is permissible when such an action is minor in relation to the
violations sought to be remedied and is aimed at eliminating the continued rule of a dangerous
threat to international peace. Therefore, under the doctrine of efficient breach, the U.S. was
justified in leading a coalition into Iraq to remove Hussein from power.
II. Factual Background
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In order to proceed through this discussion, it is first important to review the facts that led
to both the Iraq Was and the development of the IHT. Throughout this lengthy factual
discussion, this memorandum will highlight and briefly discuss issues that will become germane
to the later analysis.
A proper starting place is the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by the Hussein government of
Iraq.2 In response to this action, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted UNSC
Resolution 660, which held the invasion to be an infraction of the peace.3 Concurrent with the
adoption of this Resolution, the international community attempted to convince Iraq to withdraw
its forces from Kuwait. However, upon Iraq resisting such efforts, the UNSC adopted
Resolution 678 which permitted the nations of the UN to use military force as a method of
enforcing Resolution 660. Continuing the noncompliance, Hussein’s government ignored
Resolution 678’s required date of withdrawal. The international community then instituted an
attack on Iraq in early 1991, leading to a quick Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.4
At the end of this military action, the UNSC adopted Resolution 686 which instituted
numerous restrictions and requirements on Iraq. Subsequent to this Resolution, Resolution 687
was adopted to “affirm the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq.”5 Further, Resolution 687 is important
for the discussion of the current Iraq Was as this Resolution imposed on Iraq the requirement to
2

Andrea Carcano, End of the Occupation in 2004? The Status of the Multinational Force in Iraq After the Transfer
of Sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 41 (2004). [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
3

A violation of the United Nations Charter.

4

William H. Taft, IV, A View From the Top: American Perspectives on International Law After the Cold War, 31
YALE J. INT’L L. 503, 504 (2006). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
5

S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), available at http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/23/IMG/NR059623.pdf? (last accessed November 27, 2006).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 81].
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destroy all possessed chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. In addition, Iraq was required
to comply with inspections for such weaponry and agree to discontinue the use and possession of
such weaponry.6 The provisions of this Resolution were adopted and agreed to by the Hussein
government in an official letter in mid-1991.7
Although a fact pattern could end at this point with the UNSC-mandated process,
however, the problems of noncompliance persisted. To begin, Iraqi troops violated Resolution
687 first when they re-entered Kuwait in 1993 and, secondly, in 1993 when Iraqi leaders began
to obstruct the inspection teams operating throughout the country.8 These actions led to the
UNSC threatening “serious consequences” due to these “material breaches” on the part of the
Iraqi government.9 Within days of these strong words from the UNSC, the U.S., along with
France and England, flew over Iraq attacking various military strongholds within the Iraqi
state.10
Despite Iraq’s quick acquiescence to these military attacks in 1993, Iraq began building
up its military near Kuwait once again in 1994. This action led the UNSC to adopt Resolution
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949.11 Resolution 949 first required the removal of Iraqi troops from the Kuwaiti border, and
secondly, it restated the previous requirements by noting that noncompliance would lead to the
permissibility of “all necessary means…to restore international peace…in the area.”12
This is, however, merely the middle chapter in the story of Iraq’s relationship with the
UNSC. In 1997, Iraq resumed its disruption of the weapons inspection team. In brokering a
deal, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was able to bring the Iraqis to commit to fully permit
weapons inspections to operate within Iraq.13 However, Resolution 1154, which was to be a
codification of the brokered deal, was also used as an opportunity for members of the UNSC to
offer criticisms of the U.S. using “saber rattling” as a method of coercing Iraq to comply with the
inspections.14 Thus, the ensuing language in Resolution 1154 made a point to hold that the
Resolution was not intended to allow for an immediate military response in the event of future
noncompliance.15
In the face of further noncompliance, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1205 for the purpose
of condemning Iraq’s continued noncompliance.16 This Resolution, however, was also subject to
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noncompliance, noncompliance that led to the weapons inspectors pulling out of Iraq in the late
1990’s as the United States military carried out aerial assaults on Iraq.17
After these U.S. aerial attacks, it was not until late 2002 when weapons inspectors
returned to Iraq. Important to this discussion of the legality of the Iraq War are the words of
President Bush in 2002 when he said that “the United States’ [intentions] should not be doubted.
The Security Council resolutions will be enforced. The just demands of peace and security will
be met, or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its
power.”18 On the domestic front, the United States Congress responded by enacting a joint
resolution which gave the executive the power to use the “Armed Forces…as he determines to be
necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the U.S. against the
continuing threat posed by Iraq…and to enforce all relevant UNSC resolutions regarding Iraq.”19
In conjunction with this U.S. action, the UNSC met in an attempt to create a resolution
whereby the international community would use a two-staged treatment against Iraq.
Specifically, the plan was to first pass a strongly worded resolution condemning the current
actions by Iraq while requiring weapons inspections to resume. Then, the second stage would
only occur if Iraq remained noncompliant. This stage would be the reconvening of the UNSC to

16

S.C. Res. 1205, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3939th mtg. para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1205 (1998), available at
http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/339/14/PDF/N9833914.pdf? (last accessed November 26, 2006).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 76].

17

Bill Clinton, We Are Delivering a Powerful Message to Saddam, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1998, at A16. [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 100] Further, the United States cited Resolution 678 as the authority to conduct
such attacks as a way to “employ all necessary means to secure Iraqi compliance with the Council’s resolutions and
to restore peace and security in the area.”
18

In Bush's Words: On Iraq, UN Must Face up to Its Founding Purpose, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2002, at A10.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 104].

19

Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, §2 116 Stat. 1498,
1501 (2002). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 91].

17

pass another resolution authorizing force.20 In opposition to this two-staged approach, the U.S.
argued that the time for resolutions and multi-stepped processes had passed. The words of the
French representative are explanatory of the international community’s response: “united in
sending Iraq a message of firmness in an initial resolution, the Security Council will, we have no
doubt, remain united to assume all of its responsibilities during the second stage, should Iraq
violate its commitments.”21
It was the perspective articulated by the French representative that was adopted into
Resolution 1441 in November of 2002.22 However, despite the fact that the Resolution contained
the two-stage process, the United States could find value in its recapitulation of the litany of
previous resolutions broken by Iraq. Specifically, Resolution 1441 “recalled a number
of…previous relevant resolutions, specifically mentioning, among others, Resolutions 678, 686,
and 687.”23 Further, Resolution 1441 included a holding that Iraq was considered by the
international community to be in material breach of the previously agreed upon Resolution 687
by reason of the nation’s failure to disarm.24
While critics of Resolution 1441 may have seen it as just another stick in a growing pile
of “strongly worded” resolutions, it did include teeth. Specifically, it “afford[ed] Iraq…a final
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opportunity,”25 it re-required a complete disarmament,26 and it noted that in the face of “any false
statements or omissions,” the Security Council could “convene immediately.”27
To further understand the events which led to the Iraq War, facts which are central to the
defense’s argument of the IHT’s illegality, it soon became evident that the passage of Resolution
1441 did not land on new or changed ears in Iraq. Rather, the first reports from Hans Blix, the
head of the UN weapons inspection entity, indicated that there were extensive questions
remaining about the status of Iraq’s weapons after 1998, when the last inspections had
occurred.28
Thus, given the significant questions about Iraq’s compliance with Resolution 1441, and
the lingering questions regarding the status of Iraq’s weapons inspections, as identified by Hans
Blix in the UNSC report pertaining to the inspection period between December 1, 2002 and
February 28, 2003, the U.S. began to push for the activation of the second-prong of Resolution
1441.29 However, the UNSC found itself split on how to interpret and react, with the German
and French foreign ministers refusing military actions against Iraq,30 and the U.S. arguing to
proceed with military options after many years of Iraqi noncompliance.31
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As this split in opinions continued between the permanent members of the UNSC, the
U.S. continued its outright stance in favor of the use of military force. Thus, in March of 2003
President Bush indicated that, unless Saddam Hussein left Iraq immediately, a U.S.-led coalition
would initiate military actions in Iraq.
III. Legal Discussion
A. Historical Perspective
In arguing under the notion of “consequences of an illegal action,” the defense is using
the phrase in an analogous way as the notion of “spoils of war” and “victor’s justice” would be
used. Implicit in this inquiry is the question of what role a new governing authority should have
in directing economic recovery, future contracts, political reform, and judiciary establishment.
In a sense, if the coalition is held, arguendo, to be the ruling authority, then their actions in
handing out contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq can be argued to be improper spoils of war.
Thus, a brief introductory discussion of how contracts have been handled after shifts in
governing power throughout history will provide a helpful framework on which to build further,
and more directly applicable, lessons for the roles of newly established governments.
The first example for discussion is Russia in the early 1900’s. Here, in 1918 the Imperial
Tsar of Russia relinquished his throne and was subsequently assassinated by supporters of the
Bolshevik revolution.32 As a result of the ensuing civil war a temporary authority was
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established to run the country’s affairs, after which the Bolsheviks finally asserted control of the
Russian state.33 Thus, the question pertinent to this analysis is how the Bolsheviks handled the
ensuing discussion of economic contracts upon regime change.
The Russian government had previously contracted with Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. to
transport ammunition, weaponry, and explosive materials. After a fire broke out in 1916,
damaging the Russian shipment, a lawsuit followed for breach of contract.34 However, the
aforementioned coup occurred during the trial, and the rail road company objected to the
continuation of the trial as they argued that the rights to the materials and the contract were only
with the Imperial government, not the new Bolshevik powers. Thus, the objection was one of
standing. For the purposes of the broader discussions of this memorandum, the important
question was whether a revolutionary power, or a warring power, has the ability to establish new
or continuing procedures upon acquiring power.
In Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v State of Russia, the appellate court determined that despite
the change in power, the international state of Russia persisted and remained through the
overthrow.35 The holding argued both that the new leadership has the right and power to take on
the powers of the previous government as well as having the power to establish procedures
necessary for the proper continuation of the society, such as the instituting of judicial measures.36
A second example of regime change is the often-discussed break-up of Yugoslavia in the
early 1990’s. Here, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had long been damaged by
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civil wars, conflicts with the Serbs and Croats, and religious battles with the Muslims. This long
standing line of conflicts resulted in the fracturing of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia into five states.37 The factioning brought about the same types of questions
discussed above in Russia: who has what rights to do what? This issue was addressed in Vienna
through the passage of a treaty by leaders of all provinces in 2001.38 This treaty was not aimed
at the cessation of hostilities, but rather the specific articulation of who has the rights to do what.
In this treaty, the states each agreed to accept the contracts and obligations which had previously
been the duty of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.39 Thus, this historical example
stands for the proposition that the parties in power after a regime change have both the power
and the duty to pick up legal and economic processes immediately thereafter.
These two brief examples from history, although not directly applicable to the defense’s
objections, serve to illuminate a historical framework that acknowledges the duty of new
governments to establish procedures upon the ascension to power.
B. Defense Argument—War Was Illegal
Given that there is historical precedence for the proper roles after regime change, the
defense must acknowledge such precedent while still arguing for both the illegality of the Iraq
War and the IHT. To begin, the defense would likely categorize their arguments for the illegality
of the Iraq War into five sections, where the Iraq War was illegal because: (1) the weapon’s
inspectors were working, (2) the applicable litany of UNSC Resolutions did not permit for
military actions, (3) international law only permits military force under self-defense situations,
37
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(4) the military action is here more similar to historical examples of aggressive wars than selfdefense, and (5) general principles of international law prohibit such military action. The full
articulations of these arguments, along with contemporaneous discussion of the arguments’
shortcomings below, will provide the prosecutors of the IHT with a step-by-step method for
understanding the defense arguments along with understanding various responses.
1. Weapons Inspectors Compliance
It has been a much debated issue whether Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi government was ever
in full compliance with the requirement to permit weapons inspectors to inspect throughout Iraq
for weapons and delivery systems. The defense would likely here argue that despite questions of
compliance, the UNSC had numerous opportunities to insert military sanctions, but rather, the
UNSC never specifically articulated any military enforcement mechanisms. Thus, on this
particular question, the defense would argue that the proper recourse for the international
community was with the Security Council for a resolution of enforcement, rather than military
action.
Further, in Security Council Resolution 1154, Iraq received strong warnings, with the
inclusion of the language “severest consequences.” However, the defense would further point
out that Resolution 1154 went on to state that upon noncompliance the UNSC, not the individual
states, had the authority to “ensure implementation of this resolution and peace and security in
the area.”40
2. U.N. Resolutions
Secondly, the defense would likely argue that the litany of applicable UNSC Resolutions
precluded military action. To begin the discussion of the applicable UNSC Resolutions and how
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they fit with the defense’s arguments, the defense must first respond to the argument that the war
was permissible under the language of UNSC Resolution 678. As noted earlier, the UNSC had
adopted a resolution which authorized member states to enforce Resolution 660 with “all
necessary means” in any subsequent infraction.41 Responding to the argument that the litany of
resolutions (from Resolution 660 to Resolution 1441) did not authorize the Iraq War requires the
defense to engage in a fairly specific and narrow statutory analysis. As Resolutions 678 and
1441 are clearly “relevant” to international peace and security, as well as being clearly
“subsequent,” or “after” Resolution 660, the defense must discuss the term “subsequent” for
whether the provision in Resolution 678 that “all necessary means may be used in any
subsequent infraction,” stands in perpetuity, or only applies to Resolution 660’s enforcement.
The prosecution would here argue that “subsequent” means any violation by Iraq which occurs
after the passing of Resolution 660. Thus, this argument would continue that Resolution 678’s
authorization of all necessary means to enforce these Resolutions would clearly authorize the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.
However, the defense would respond by arguing that such a reading of the word
“subsequent” is improper. Rather, they would argue that a more appropriate reading would
apply the provisions of Resolution 660 only until the adoption of Resolution 678. The adoption
of Resolution 678, according to the defense, would then have supplanted the holdings of
Resolution 660. This argument is bolstered by the language surrounding the adoption of
Resolution 678, as it was purely retrospective, not looking at the implementation of future
resolutions.42
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Then, the defense would argue that Resolution 687, adopted at the conclusion of the first
Gulf War, operated to break the line of resolutions that included Resolution 660 and Resolution
678, as Resolution 687 was a cease fire between Iraq, Kuwait, and all involved nations. Thus,
Resolution 687, according to the defense, would purportedly lay the issues of Resolutions 660
and 678 to rest, terminating their “subsequent” effect. However, this argument ignores the fact
that Resolution 949, adopted after 687, specifically refers to the prospective weight and authority
of Resolution 678.43 If the defense view were proper, then the UNSC would not have
retroactively referred to the provisions of 678, because it purportedly operated to merely end the
previous resolutions.
Moving forward, another issue that may be raised by the defense regarding the illegality
of the Iraq War, as the premise of their argument for the illegality of the IHT, is the question of
whether the adoption of Resolution 687 specifically authorizes the U.S.-led invasion into Iraq.
The defense would have to respond to the argument that Resolution 687 authorized the attack
due to Iraq’s continued “material breach[es].”44 The defense would first point to the UN Charter
as it fully grants to the UNSC the authority to maintain peace. The defense’s reading, then, of
this provision would be that the cease-fire of 687 was not an agreement between the involved
states (because, if seen as such, then under theories of contract law, the U.S. could find Iraq’s
“In this resolution, we have done more than simply reiterat[e] our commitment to the earlier decisions we
have taken. What we are saying is that, should the government of Iraq continue to choose to ignore its
obligations under international law, and under Security Council resolutions, the Member States, cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, will be authorized to use all necessary means to uphold and
ensure the implementation of these resolutions.” Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Nine
Hundred and Sixty-Third Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 71, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2963 (1990)
as cited in A. Mark Weisburd, The War in Iraq and the Dilemma of Controlling the International Use of
Force, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 521, 532 (2004). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 75].
43

See S.C. Res. 949 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 83].

44

S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), available at http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/23/IMG/NR059623.pdf? (last accessed November 26, 2006).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 81].

25

material breaches as violations specifically against the U.S. rather than against the international
community in general) rather, the defense would argue that Resolution 687 was a mandate from
the UNSC under their plenary authority to maintain peace. Under the defense argument, it
would only be for the UNSC to respond to the breach of such a mandate.
This highly technical argument would mean that the U.S.-led coalition could not argue
that their cease-fire agreement with Iraq was breached, leading to the permissibility of military
action, as the agreement was not with them in their individual capacity. Specifically, the defense
would advance an argument that, to adopt the American’s view would mean that the UNSC, in
effect, relinquished their Charter-given authority to the member states in their own individual
capacities.
If the theory is accepted that the Resolution 687 was a mandate by the UNSC, then it
would be uncertain what impact breach would have. Under such lack of clarity, it may be
assumed that the duty would revert back to the UNSC to make a determination of what response
is actually appropriate. Thus, the defense would argue that a breach of Resolution 687, even if
held to be “material” or “grave,” would only be addressable by the UNSC upon a determination
that the infraction endangers international peace and security.
This question of who has the power to enforce a resolution would have divergent answers
between the prosecution and defense, divergent answers that have great impact. While the
defense would here argue that only the UNSC possesses such power and authority, they would
have to respond to four instances after 1991 where individual states used force outside of the
UNSC in response to Iraq’s violations of Resolution 687. Specifically, there were aerial assaults
of Iraq in 1993 when Iraq began to reinstate its military near the Kuwaiti border,45 threats of
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force in 1997 when Iraq was resisting compliance with weapons inspections,46 the 1998
bombings from American and British planes,47 and further threats of force in response to the
build-up of the Iraqi military on the Kuwaiti border.48 Thus, if the actions in these four scenarios
were without specific authority from the Security Council, then the defense’s argument would
require these to have been condemned. However, instead of condemning these actions, the
UNSC found Iraq in “material breach” and added after-the-fact approval by the Secretary
General that the uses of force, and the threats thereof, had been in response to Iraq’s material
breach. Under the defense’s view, though, if the actions were truly unauthorized from the
beginning, they all should have been seen as illegal. The post-hoc approval directly undercuts
that argument.
Moving beyond the defense’s answer to the Resolution 687 questions, they would next
have to directly address Resolution 1441. The defense would likely do so with a reiteration of
their Resolution 687 arguments. However, the defense would need to overcome the inclusion by
the UNSC of the specific finding that Iraq was in “material breach.”49 This would likely be
overcome by a defense argument that a finding of “material breach” is of no consequence to
members of the UNSC, as the Security Council in and of itself has authority to enforce
obligations. Further, the earlier discussion of the enactment of Resolution 1441 illuminates the
most convincing defense argument whereby it can be shown that the UNSC voted not to include
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a specific enforcement provision in Resolution 1441, but rather required that upon a finding of
noncompliance, the entire UNSC would reconvene to choose a course of action.50
Further, the defense would likely point directly to the comments by the representative of
the United States during the adoption of Resolution 1441, where he pointed out that, regarding
the use of force there were no triggers or automatic responses.51 Further, the American
representative indicated that “the matter will return to the Council for discussions as required in
paragraph 12…the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations,
this resolution does not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the
threat posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace
and security.”52
3. U.N. Charter’s Use of Force Provisions
The third argument likely to be raised by Saddam’s defense team in an effort to show the
illegality of the Iraq War, and thus the IHT, is through the UN Charter’s use of force provisions.
Specifically, the defense would likely point to Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. Here, the
Charter states that no member nation possesses the right to enforce any resolution militarily
without the UNSC first finding a material breach of a previous resolution.53 Further, these
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Articles hold that the UNSC must also find that all remedies of a non-military nature have been
exhausted.54
The defense’s use of these articles would state that they are the complete articulation of
when force may be used under international law. This argument would go on to show that force
is only permissible outside of these Articles in the limited circumstances of Article 51’s selfdefense provisions.55 A strict interpretation of Article 51 would require the U.S. to only act
militarily when either the U.S. was specifically threatened, or, under the “collective self-defense”
provision, a neighbor of Iraq was either attacked or feared an attack and asked for the help of the
U.S.56
However, the defense would argue that the nations around Iraq did not express a fear of
attack, but rather they objected to the invasion of Iraq itself.57 Although there was only limited
support from Arab states for the first Gulf War as an act of collective self-defense, there was no
such sentiment with the current invasion of Iraq.58 As a specific example, the Saudi Prince noted
that the United States should not strike Iraq, because such an attack would only raise animosity
in the region against the United States.59
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Under the specific discussion of Article 51’s self-defense provision, one which was cited
often in the build-up to the 2003 Iraq War,60 the defense must address the existence of an
inherent right of self-defense. In short, the question comes down to the scope of Article 51.61
This debate of Article 51’s scope is predominantly a discussion of when Article 51 becomes
active. Does it only become active when an actual “armed attack” commences and missiles are
in the air? What about when military vessels leave one nation destined for another state--is it
active then? What about during the planning stages immediately preceding an attack?
Scholars have long debated this point of when self-defense is valid.62 While imminence
may seem to require waiting until the “punch has been thrown,” others cite a looser inherent
right to defend oneself. Under the latter argument, a state which fears an “imminent attack” is
permitted to preemptively stop such an attack.63 However, even under this more expansive view,
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it is still an open question whether an Iraqi attack on the U.S. was “imminent.”64 Thus, the
defense would likely respond that the Article 51 provisions were only meant to be used in the
face of an “imminent attack.”
However, the defense response to the argument of an inherent right of self-defense under
Article 51 serves only to shift focus of the debate. As the Article 51 debate immediately above
centered on whether the attack was “imminent,” the defense merely shifts the discussion to
whether “imminent” means that the “boats have to be packed and boarded” or just “being
planned on being packed and boarded.” In making this argument, the defense team would likely
propose that violations of a cease-fire and the noncompliance with inspections cannot be held
tantamount to an imminent attack. Thus, through this discussion of the UN Charter’s use of
force provisions, it becomes apparent that individual states primarily rest their use of force on
self-defense justifications under Article 51.
4. Historic Examples of Aggressive War
A fourth topic likely to arise in the defense’s argument for the illegality of both the Iraq
War and the IHT is the equating of the Iraq War to other examples from history of aggressive
war that were denounced by the international community. While the opponents of the Iraq War
may state the “evil” of Saddam’s regime, they are quick to undermine the argued legal
justification for the Iraq war. Some will equate such a military action to the Vietnamese invasion
of Cambodia in the late 1970’s, an action which the U.S. vocally condemned as aggressive and

64

See e.g.: Michael T. Wawrzycki, The Waning Power of Shard Sovereignty in International Law: The Evolving
Effect of U.S. Hegemony, 14 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 579 (2006). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
50]; Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, Walking an International Law Tightrope: Use of Military Force to Counter
Terrorism—Willing the Ends, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405 (2006). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34];
and John E. Rielly, America Unbound: The Future of American Hegemony, 30 VT. L. REV. 123 (2005). [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 39].

31

illegal.65 Or, others will analogize this U.S.-led war to the invasion of Egypt by England, Israel,
and France, another action objected to as aggressive.66 Specifically, the U.S. responded to the
invasion of Egypt by arguing that international law required such an action to go before the
UNSC.67 Thus, if these examples from history are seen as illegal under international law, and
the current Iraq War can be analogized thereto, then the argument by analogy would lead to the
Iraq War being illegal.
The defense, however, in making this analogy, would need to respond to the international
community’s belief that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and, as such, the war was
dissimilar to those aggressive war examples.68 Proponents of the defense’s argument would
show that, despite arguments and showings in the alternative, there has been no evidence that
Iraq possessed, or was attempting to possess, such weapons. Further, these same proponents will
cite the fact that prior to their withdrawal in 1998, weapons inspectors oversaw the destruction of
numerous chemical weapons, biological agents, and missile warheads.69 Further, such
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arguments will also rely on recent reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency which
declare an end to Iraq’s nuclear program.70
However, implicit in this discussion of the “successful” disarming of Iraq are questions of
whether efforts which achieve “almost” full compliance are sufficient to stand for the proposition
that all weapons were eliminated, and further that a finding from 1997 and 1998 can stand for the
proposition that there were still no weapons in the early 2000s.
Then, moving to another of the defense’s argument that the Iraq War was an unjustified
military action, and thus analogous to these aggressive wars, many scholars point out that the “in
the name of terrorism” argument by the Bush administration does not work due to the lack of a
connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq. Here, the defense would argue that there is a lack of
evidence that the secular Ba’athist regime, the leading party under Saddam, which had limited
Islam in Iraq, would have interacted with Osama bin Laden or other members of Al Qaeda.71
Specifically, it has been pointed out by former intelligence officer of Saudi Arabia, Turki bin
Faisal, that bin Laden thinks of Hussein as an “apostate, an infidel, or someone who is not
worthy of being a fellow Muslim.”72
However, the defense would have to here present evidence against the far more accepted
terrorist connection between Saddam Hussein’s regime and Palestinian terrorists. Further, this
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argument would have to overcome the well established link between the Iraqi regime and
terrorists who attempted to assassinate the former U.S. President, George H.W. Bush in 1993.73
Finally, under the aforementioned requirement that all non-military options first be
exhausted, the defense argument must show that all options had not been exhausted, making this
war an aggressive act. It would need to be shown that administrative remedies, such as the
weapons inspections, would better solve the problem of Iraq’s desire to acquire weapons. Thus,
since the inspectors were previously removed, and then Iraq refused their reentry, proponents of
the argument that the Iraq War was illegal must show that something was wrong with the
previous inspections, thus permitting Iraq to kick out the inspectors. For instance, they may
argue that the U.S. improperly used the inspection teams for intelligence gathering. This
argument, thus, must show that it would have been a productive course of action to have pushed
for deterrence and weapons inspections, rather than military action.
However, unless the defense could successfully analogize the current Iraq War to the
invasions of Egypt and Cambodia, then these examples from history would be unsuccessful in
casting a shadow of illegality onto the current war. Rather, they would merely serve as proper
examples of aggressive war, highlighting that the current Iraq War is not such a venture.
5. Illegal Under International Law
As a fifth and final argument for the illegality of the Iraq War, the premise for the
argument that the IHT is illegal, the defense is likely to argue a nuanced statutory interpretation
of the UN Charter as a whole. To begin, they would show that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
creates the general presumption that a nation-state may not use or threaten to use force “against
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the territorial integrity…of any state.”74 Further, the Charter specifically delineates the
exceptions to this standard by providing for the circumstances under which a nation may use
military force against another nation. First, as previously discussed, the most commonly cited
permission for the use of force is found in Article 51, 75 where the Charter preserves for the
nations an “inherent right of…self-defense if any armed attack occurs.”76 However, the
prosecution can here respond that Article 2(4) has been subjected to widespread abuse since the
1940’s,77 practically nullifying the prohibitions of that section.78 Thus, it can be argued that the
UN Charter provisions of Article 2(4) are not here analogous to customary international law
because the development of a customary international law norm requires “state practice.” If the
historical perspective just mentioned shows repeated violations, then there is no consistent state
practice, and thus, no international law norm.
Secondly, the UN Charter holds that the UNSC has the discretionary power to respond to
international military incursions, and, under Article 25, the member states of the United Nations
agree to comply with and carry out the decisions of the UNSC.79
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Thirdly, Article 39 of the Charter delineates to the UNSC the power and duty to
“determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
to make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles
41 and 42, to maintain or restore the international peace and security.”80 Lastly, under the
aforementioned Article 42, the Charter grants to the Security Council the role of authorizing
member states to use military action in response to a threat to peace.81
The defense would likely take this set of Charter provisions and argue that if the five
permanent members of the UNSC had voted that the situation in Iraq in late 2002 was a threat to
international peace, then they would have been justified to vote, as a Security Council, to permit
the use of force. As this was not in fact the process adopted, the defense would argue that the
U.S., acting without UNSC authority, was in direct violation of Article 2(4) when it instituted a
military action based solely on the goal of removing the Hussein government from power, an
attack on the political and territorial integrity of a sovereign nation.82
C. The Iraqi High Tribunal
Having now discussed the defense’s likely arguments for the illegality of the Iraq War,
that is only half of the defense’s argument. The defense will argue not merely for the illegality
of the Iraq War, but also a purported connection of that illegality to the IHT. Even if the defense
is successful in arguing the illegality of the Iraq War, they have not succeeded regarding the IHT.
The defense must still make a showing that such a finding makes the IHT an illegal enterprise.
Thus, the defense team would likely propose an argument that the IHT represents “victor’s
80
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justice,” or illegal “spoils of war.” In short, they must show that first, an illegal use of force
vitiates anything which occurs subsequently or proximately, and, secondly, that the U.S. is the
direct recipient of the “spoils.” However, before entering the defense arguments specifically
relating to the IHT, it must first be established how the IHT came into existence, specifically in
comparison to other tribunals that are held to have been legal enterprises.
1. How Was the IHT Formed?
After the overthrow of the Hussein regime in Iraq, the newly formed Iraqi government
drafted the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. The Iraqi High Tribunal, as it was later named,
was then ratified when the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) approved the statute in December of
2003.
In May, 2003, President Bush announced that major combat operations had ended, and
that the forces in Iraq were now operating as occupiers.83 Just over one year later, the U.S.-led
coalition announced that the occupation had ended.84 It was with this proclamation that the U.S.led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) assumed the internationally recognized leadership of
Iraq. The duty assigned to the CPA was to govern Iraq in compliance with Security Council
Resolution 1483.85 The CPA then gave way to the IGC in July of 2003. The IGC was instituted
to operate as the transitional governing body in Iraq.86 However, the actions of the IGC were
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subject to the approval of the CPA.87 Under the IGC’s leadership, the U.S. continued to operate
militarily as a police power, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1511.88
As these various governing powers assessed post-war Iraq, the need for a judicial body to
address the pre-war violations of Hussein’s Ba’ath party became evident. While many post-war
states find themselves instituting international tribunals,89 the Bush Administration, with the
urging of the Iraqi leadership, favored a national Iraqi tribunal,90 primarily because the value to a
domestic tribunal rests in the fact that the aggrieved people have a direct say in the form of
justice. In further difference from other tribunals,91 the IHT was not established by a United
Nations Security Council Resolution, but rather through the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal,
which was approved in late 2003 by the IGC and the CPA.92
Upon its creation, the IHT was divided into five distinct sections: (1) investigating
judges, (2) trial chambers (each consisting of five judges), (3) prosecutors, (4) an appeals
chamber, (5) and an administrative wing.93 The IHT possesses jurisdiction for war crimes,
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crimes against humanity, genocide, and a collection of specific Iraqi law violations.94
Jurisdiction over these crimes is limited to those which occurred between July, 1968 and May,
2003.
2. Other Tribunals
Before discussing the legality of the IHT, it is beneficial to discuss other tribunals that
have been held by the international community to be legal enterprises. In the aftermath of the
Second World War, international tribunals were established in both Nuremberg and Tokyo.
These international judicial bodies were formed to prosecute German and Japanese war
criminals, respectively.95 As will become important in discussing the IHT, both the Nuremberg
and Tokyo Tribunals existed as neither fully criminal nor fully international in nature, but rather
they were composed of multinational military components. Further, it is important to note that
both of these tribunals were operated purely by the victorious warring powers. Thus, if one were
looking for tribunals which were “victor’s justice,” these two tribunals would stand as clear
examples. However, both of these tribunals have been held as valid and integral in the
establishment of international law.
The first modern day international tribunal, then, was formed in 1993 by the UNSC in
response to crimes alleged to have occurred in the worn-torn former Yugoslavia. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was formed as an “ad hoc”
tribunal of limited jurisdiction. Specifically, it was given the task of prosecuting “persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
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the former Yugoslavia since 1991.”96 In contrast to both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals,
the ICTY was the first truly international tribunal.97
In the 1990s, the former Yugoslavia was engaged in a war plagued with atrocities
including the sexual enslavement of young girls, men being buried alive, and ethnic cleansing.98
It became such a dire situation as one soldier forced a prisoner of the opposition to orally castrate
another man.99 Thus, the ICTY was created as an international reaction to these grave atrocities.
This judicial entity, a body which is currently proceeding through its jurisdictional mandate, has
returned over 100 indictments, and was in the middle of prosecuting the leader of the former
Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, when he died.100
However, it is not the egregious history from the former Yugoslavia that is important
here, rather, it is the formation of the ICTY that is directly applicable. In determining a need to
prosecute the war crimes that occurred in the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations turned to
Article 41 of the UN Charter for the power to use non-military measures to “restore international
peace and security.”101 Thus, in acting under its non-military powers, the UNSC adopted
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Resolution 827 to establish the ICTY.102 Specifically, the UNSC created a four-part test for the
ICTY:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

bring justice to persons responsible for violations of international humanitarian law;
give justice to the victims;
deter future war crimes; and
help to restore peace through reconciliation.103

However, despite the fact that the ICTY is now often cited for the authority of its
decisions, there lacked international consensus at the time of its adoption. The Chinese
representative, for instance, argued that the ICTY must never “constitute any precedent.”104
However, in opposition to China’s views, the representatives of Western nations like the United
Kingdom, Spain and France argued that the creation of the ICTY stood for international
acceptance of the need for an international criminal court. Whatever the lasting impact of the
ICTY, it stands at this point as an influential modern day tribunals. Thus, important for the
discussion herein, minor defects in the establishment of a judicial tribunal are not necessarily
determinative of that tribunal’s illegality.
3. Is the IHT Itself Illegal?
Having an understanding of the IHT’s formation, it is now important to discuss the
central aspect of the defense’s argument, whether the IHT itself is illegal. The defense’s
argument would likely here focus on the U.S. participation in the formation of the IHT. This is
particularly true given that the defense would argue against the IHT not as a separate discussion
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from the Iraq War, but rather as specifically tied to the Iraq War. As such, the defense must
argue the connection between the two topics.
To begin, a central issue regarding the U.S. involvement in the IHT is the fact that the
U.S. hand-picked the members of the IGC, who then established the IHT. Further, the U.S. not
only then gave $75 million to help start the IHT, but they also sent a tribunal liaison to train
judges, assist in the translation, and aid investigation.105 The defense would also likely point to
an August 2003 report from the UN team assigned the task of reviewing the credibility and
functionality of the IHT which described the tribunal as “degraded.”106 Specifically, this U.N.
body cited that the tribunal was “not capable of rendering fair and effective justice for violations
of international humanitarian law.”107 Further, as the judiciary of the IHT was, in effect,
appointed by the CPA, the defense will likely further argue that such procedures violate Articles
1 through 5 of the UN Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary, a set of principles which
strongly disapprove of “judicial appointments for improper motives.”108
In short, the U.S. influence argument against the IHT is based on a proposed connection
between the Tribunal and the U.S. which purports to damage the IHT’s credibility. However, as
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noted above, such an argument fails to show illegality. As much as one may want to argue the
appearance of collusion or the mis-administration of justice, those are not attacks on legality as
arising from “consequences of an illegal action.”
Further, the defense will argue that the IHT is illegal due to facts beyond those of U.S.
influence, rather arguing illegality due to unfairness. Specifically, the defense would point out
that several members of the court are not, at least facially, impartial. Some were imprisoned by
Hussein, while others are known as long-time opponents of Hussein’s regime.109 Thus, there are
valid arguments against the impartiality of this tribunal; but such arguments fall short of showing
illegality.
To best articulate and summarize the defense’s criticism of the IHT, Asli U. Bali’s
argument that the tribunal lacks legitimacy due to the U.S.-led war and occupation is
illustrative.110 First, Bali argues that the invasion and subsequent U.S.-led occupation of Iraq
was in violation of international law, and, secondly, that during the occupation the U.S. has
repeatedly ignored international law relating to “belligerent occupation” as articulated under the
Geneva Convention.111 As an example, “belligerent occupation” requires an occupying power to
preserve the status quo in both the law and politics of the country at issue, short of alterations for
the sake of security. However, the Bush administration vocally articulated one of the main
premises for invading Iraq to be regime change, which is clearly not the maintenance of the
status quo. Thus, the Bush administration was not inclined to observe the “belligerent
109
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occupation” standards. Further, Bali points out that the “alterations” to the Iraqi system were not
done through Iraqi consent, democracy, or international legitimacy.112 According to Bali, Iraq
would be better run under the purview of a trustee; as such an entity would not be subject to
many of the criticisms plaguing the current government.113
Next, the defense will likely argue that the IHT is per se illegal under international law.
Under the principles of international law that the defense would likely cite, the U.S. is acting as
an occupying force, and, under international law, “occupying forces” cannot:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

change the functioning of the administration of the occupied state;114
change the status quo legal system;115
alter the status of public officials;116
alter the penal rules;117
change tribunals;118
jail civilian population for any crime other than as prisoners of war;119 or
prosecute inhabitants for pre-occupation crimes.120

The defense would likely concede that these rules contain some flexibility for changes in the
name of security, but they would likely be quick to argue that such an exception would not
permit drastic changes to all of the above categories. However, many of the standards that apply
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to the powers of an occupying power are found under Protocol I of the Geneva Convention.121
However, despite the defense’s argument for the applicability of these standards, the U.S. is not a
signatory to Protocol I, and therefore is not bound by its rules. Further, the defense would apply
standards (a)-(g) from above and argue that the establishment of the IHT is in violation of the
Geneva Convention standards and customary international humanitarian law, because the IHT
was set up by an occupying power.122
Further, the defense may argue that the establishment of an ad-hoc tribunal is also a
violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).123 This further
legal criticism of the IHT asserts that the ICCPR articulates the minimum standards required for
protecting the rights of an accused, rights that the defense would argue are missing from the IHT.
As an example, in the IHT there is no prohibition of double jeopardy, a standard required by the
ICCPR.124 Also, the IHT permits the death penalty, about which Kofi Annan expressed concerns
of the international community acting to further any tribunal which has the death penalty. Annan
argued that such a provision does not comply with “international standards.”125
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Beyond many of the above policy critiques of the IHT, the defense would likely argue
that, under a legal analysis, the IHT also violates international law by permitting retroactive
punishment. For instance, Article 15 of the ICCPR,126 Article 9 of the American Convention on
Human Rights,127 and Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights,128 all prohibit
retroactive judicial punishment. However, the IHT has jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity which occurred before 2003, although, under the previous 1969
Iraqi Criminal Code, no such crimes were listed. Thus, enforcement of this jurisdiction by the
IHT would be retroactive.
Therefore, to recapitulate the defense’s arguments for the illegality of the IHT itself, the
defense would argue the illegality due to U.S.-influence, a lack of impartiality, and a myriad of
international law claims. However, as briefly noted above, and as will be discussed in more
length below, such arguments are insufficient to bolster the argument of the IHT’s illegality
under concepts of “consequences of an illegal action.” While the defense’s arguments may stand
properly as critiques and recommendations, they are insufficient to stand for illegality.
D. The Iraq War Was Legal
Having now proceeded through the defense arguments of the illegality of the Iraq War
and the purported connection to the IHT, with brief discussions of how the prosecution could
respond, it must now be discussed at greater length how the prosecution can properly respond.
There are many avenues to choose, but the most susceptible aspects of the defense’s argument
are first the questions of the Iraq War and, secondly, the purported connection between the IHT
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and the Iraq War. Beginning with response arguments for why the Iraq War was a legal venture,
the justifications offered by both the Bush administration and scholars are proper starting points.
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration articulated the
“Bush Doctrine.”129 This Doctrine argues that strategic preemption130 is central to American
self-defense. Opponents, however, argue that preemptive self-defense,131 and preemption in
general, must be left only to “dire necessity.” However, such a view fundamentally
misunderstands the situation in which the U.S. finds itself after September 11th, and the new
threats which are now commonplace.
To see the U.S.’s justification for the use of preemption in the Iraq War, the letter given
to the Secretary General of the UN by the leaders of U.S., the United Kingdom, and Australia is
illustrative.132 First, these leaders argued that Iraq’s continued failure to comply with Resolution
687’s disarmament requirements, as specifically highlighted by the entire UNSC in Resolution
1441, reinstated the authority to use force found in Resolution 678, as such failures by Iraq ended
that cease-fire agreement.133 Further, these leaders argued that military action was required in an
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effort to “defend the United States and the international community from the threat posed by
Iraq.”134
To begin, those who argue against the concept of preemptive self-defense miss the fact
that the U.S. has long practiced preemptive self-defense.135 For instance, President John F.
Kennedy’s quarantine order against Cuba in 1962, based on an attempt to impede the Soviet
Union from being able to lodge more long range missiles on the Cuban Island, was a wholly
preemptive action.136 In the face of merely a threat, the U.S. instituted blockades, which are
military offenses. In jargon, the Kennedy administration termed this action as “policy oriented”
self-defense,137 but one must keep in mind that this action was military in nature and was very
strong under international law.138 However, there is no mistaking the fact that President
Kennedy’s action was strikingly preemptive in nature, as an attack was, at most, distant.
If a threat from Russia was significant enough for the Kennedy administration to use
preemptive force, then it must be similarly accepted that the post-September 11th world yields as
high, if not higher, of a threat. Specifically, this is due to the fact that terrorist attacks are not
stopped, as would be done against a typical military threat, by merely taking out a leader or a
specific actor immediately before an attack. Rather, in order to have stopped the September 11th
attacks, overthrowing governments which sympathize with Al Qaeda, or even killing Bin Laden
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himself in August of 2001, would not have been sufficient. Rather, the western efforts to prevent
9/11 would have required an attack on Muslim states years earlier. Thus, if preemption was
permissible in the face of a possible Russian attack, it was all the more permissible against the
modern-day threats.
Further, it can most aptly be said that the U.S.’s use of preemption was actually a method
of deterrence. As economic embargos can only have minimal effect on a group with little
international economic trade, governments opposing terrorists, and nations that support terrorists,
must determine what can effectively work as deterrence. As noted by David Rivikin, “in
response, the new salutary strategic arithmetic created by the U.S. preemptive posture is
deliberately somewhat hazy to potential enemy states, nudging them toward demonstrating that
they do not harbor terrorists, rather than forcing the United States to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that they do.”139
Then, accepting the concept of preemptive military action as historically used and
appreciated, the next question is whether the doctrine of preemptive self-defense permits the
specific actions in Iraq? More aptly, the debate becomes a question of when, in the modern age
of warfare, American military power may be used.
To reiterate, the earlier discussed criticisms of the invasion of Iraq rest most squarely on
the Charter of the United Nations, where critics argue that preemptive self-defense is outlawed
under the UN Charter.140 Such an argument requires an explanation that the Charter in some
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way stripped and replaced well founded pre-existing norms of customary international law.141
The idea that the UN Charter replaced customary international law struggles to stand up against
the fact that the UN Charter was not signed until 1945, a date after many signatory nations had
employed the use of preemptive force in accordance with international law.142
Thus, under these arguments the prosecution should first respond to the defense’s
argument by showing the validity of the Iraq War, a showing which wholly undercuts the
defense argument. However, in an effort to provide the prosecution with a wide array of
arguments, the following discussion is important in the event that a judicial body sides with the
defense regarding the illegality of the Iraq War.
E. The Connection Between the Iraq War and the IHT is Incorrect.
Having now argued for the validity of the Iraq War, it is important that the prosecution
not confine their responses solely to the legality of the Iraq War. Thus, this second argument
accepts, arguendo, the defense’s argument that the Iraq War was illegal, and holds that even
under such a holding, the IHT is still a valid enterprise.
To begin, the defense’s argument would hold that the Iraqi people do not possess the
power to establish their own jurisdiction for the crimes which occurred at the hands of their own
government. However, as argued below, the Iraqi people have both a legal and moral right to
compose a judicial body for those within the Ba’athist party who inflicted war crimes on the
Iraqi people.
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Specifically, upon the falling of an oppressive regime, under military and treaty law, it is
the duty of those assuming power to establish both law and order.143 Thus, it was the proper role
of the governing authorities to exercise punitive accountability against the previous regime.
Michael Newton, one of the legal scholars who assisted in drafting the Statute for the Iraqi
Special Tribunal, noted that “the dedication of the Iraqi legal professionals to restore the rule of
law reflects the broader societal thirst for accountability that is a foreseeable feature of a postconflict civil society emerging from widespread and official governmental human rights
abuses.”144
To begin, a first justification for the legal validity of the IHT is the “law of occupation.”
As a territory will be considered, under international law, as occupied when “it is actually placed
under the authority of the hostile army,”145 the situation in Iraq after the fall of Saddam was
clearly that of an occupation. Moreover, when a nation takes on occupational power, they have
the obligation to “take all…measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as
possible…safety.”146 Thus, under the rules of international occupation law, the establishment of
the IHT was a mandate upon the new governing authorities.
Beyond this mandate, the discussion of the war itself is moot as there is an insufficient tie
between the Iraq War and the IHT. The war was conducted by a U.S.-led coalition. The Iraqi
High Tribunal is led by the Iraqi people. Thus, despite the earlier discussed U.S.-participation,
the fact that it is not the warring powers running the tribunals indicates that there is no “victor’s
143
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justice,” or “spoils of war.” It would be incorrect, then, to analogize this current situation to one
where the U.S. overthrew the Iraqi regime and then nationalized all oil production under the U.S.
government. That would be a clear example of illegal “spoil of war.” However, here the Iraqi
people who established the IHT had no part in the action being claimed to have been illegal.
Again, it would be naïve to argue a complete lack of influence from the U.S. onto the formation
of the IHT, but such minor connection is outweighed by the fact that the IHT is run not by the
warring powers, but rather the Iraqi people.
The closest arguable continued influence is that the U.S. has stayed on for advisory
support. Again, although such arguments show some influence, they do not show illegality. It
was the duty of the CPA to temporarily govern. Specifically, the CPA itself articulated its
authority as vesting with “all executive, legislative, and judicial authority necessary to achieve its
objectives, to be exercised under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, including
Resolution 1483, and the law and usages of war.”147 Further, despite the participation of the
CPA in establishing the IHT, the subsequent validation of the IHT by the Iraqi government
breaks any purported tie between the U.S.-led CPA and the IHT.
Beyond just tenuous arguments for the validity of the CPA’s actions under general
international norms of occupational law, the UNSC articulated specific duties for the CPA when
it called on the CPA to fully comply with “their obligations under international law including in
particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.”148
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Michael Newton offers an explicit statutory analysis of the international law justification
for establishing a new legal regime in Iraq:
The second paragraph of Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is
the key to understanding the promulgation of the IST. Juxtaposed against
the Article 64 authority to ‘subject the population of the occupied
territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power
to fulfill its obligation under the present Convention,’ Article 47 of the
Convention makes clear that such ‘provisions’ may include sweeping
changes to the domestic legal and governmental structures. Article 47
implicitly concedes power to the occupying force to ‘change . . . the
institutions or government’ of the occupied territory, so long as those
changes do not deprive the population of the benefits of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. Of particular note to the IST process, Article 47
also prevented the CPA from effectuating changes that would undermine
the rights enjoyed by the civilian population ‘by any agreement
concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the
Occupying Power.’ Thus, the CPA could not hide behind the fig leaf of
domestic decision making to simply stand by as domestic authorities in
occupied Iraq created a process that would have undermined the human
rights of those Iraqi citizens accused of even the most severe human
rights abuses during the period of the ‘entombed regime.’149
Thus, under both Article 47 and Article 64, the CPA possessed the explicit power and duty to
structure a judicial system for the Iraqi people in response to the crimes of the Ba’athist regime.
Continuing the acceptance, arguendo, that the Iraq War was illegal, the defense argument
that such illegality makes the IHT illegal is further incorrect because the crimes being tried by
the IHT far pre-dated the Iraq War. The aforementioned Security Council Resolutions pile up to
create a staggering list of indictments against the activities of Hussein’s violent regime.
Specifically, Saddam is not here being held and tried for how he acted during the war itself.
Establishing the IHT for such a purpose would be analogous to bringing someone in for
questioning about a crime which he did not commit, and then, if he happened to lie in that
interview, charging him for that lie. Such treatment is often subject to criticism under theories of
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entrapment.150 Yes, the individual did in fact lie to the authorities, but his lie was brought about
by a misstep on the part of the government. However, this is not the situation here; rather, the
IHT is charging Saddam with crimes that all predated the war. Thus, these violations existed
before the war. As such, Saddam was outside of the law before the war. Therefore, the war
operated merely as the mechanism to bring Saddam to trail, and if the war is found to be illegal,
the trial itself is still a legal venture.
Specifically, among the many charges being brought in the IHT are the deaths of 9 people
killed in the crackdown on the town of Dujail in 1982, the unlawful arrest of 399 townspeople,
the torture of women and children, the razing of farmland,151 the killing of 148 Shiites sentenced
to death by the Revolutionary Court,152 and issuing death sentences for 148 townspeople.153
As these crimes all predate the Iraq War, the discussion of the war itself is moot. There
are many ways jurisdiction could have been obtained, whether by the United Nations
establishing an international tribunal, the International Criminal Court, of the IHT. However, the
mere fact that the Iraq War was the method used does not vitiate jurisdiction even if the war
itself is found to be illegal.
F. It Does Not Matter if the Iraq War is Held To Be Legal or Illegal
Thus far the responses to the defense arguments have been that the Iraq War was valid,
which attacks the defense’s premise, and then that, accepting arguendo the Iraq War as illegal,
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the IHT is still valid. However, a third argument that can be used by the prosecution is that the
discussion of the Iraq War is of no consequence. Under the doctrine of efficient breach, “the
minor costs of a territorial infraction are outweighed by the benefits to the international
community.”154
This model, which applies often to extraterritorial abductions, argues that violating
another state’s territorial sovereignty is permissible where: (1) the threat is imminent, (2) the
opportunity for remedial measures is fleeting, (3) the target nation is unwilling to cooperate, (4)
the international community is gridlocked, (5) the territorial infringement is reasonably limited,
(6) the operation involves minimal threat to bystanders, and (7) the accused receives humane
treatment and a fair trial.155
Here, the application of the efficient breach doctrine would hold that the violation of
territorial sovereignty is justified because it was the more efficient option to breach Iraq’s
sovereignty, rather than permit the existence of a war criminal at large. It would be naïve,
though, to overlook the obvious fact that the Iraq War was more substantial of a breach of
sovereignty than a special operations abduction of a known terrorist. However, the crimes
committed by the Hussein government were also drastically higher than those of the average
terrorist. Thus, there is a higher threshold for permissible breaches of sovereignty to rid the
international community of a war criminal.
Lastly, in further arguing that the discussion of the Iraq War does not matter to the
discussion of the legality of the IHT, another look at the ICTY is important. From the following
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discussion, it is shown that questions of the events preceding the establishment of a tribunal are
moot, and thus the discussion of the Iraq War is merely a “red herring.”
It has been asserted that the ICTY was illegal as it was created under powers which were
in excess of those delineated to the UNSC.156 Specifically, “the drafters of the United Nations
Charter never contemplated the establishment of a criminal tribunal and the powers to create
such an institution were never conferred upon the Security Council.”157 In the case of
Prosecutor v Tadic,158 the ICTY case that directly addressed the question of the ICTY’s legality
in light of its formation, the Appeals Chamber specifically held for the validity of the ICTY. The
Appeals Chamber initiated its analysis with the recognition of the fact tribunal establishment is
not an explicitly enunciated power in either Article 41 or 42 of the UN Charter.159 In response to
Tadic’s argument that the ICTY was illegal, the Appeals Chamber reasoned that the Article 41
measures are “merely illustrative examples which obviously do not exclude other measures.”160
However, this holding by the Appeals Chamber has been argued to be incorrect. This criticism is
based on the statutory construction theory of ejusdem generis, or “of the same genus.” This is a
“canon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of
specific…things, the general word or phrase will be construed as applying only to persons or
things of the class within which the specific types fall.”161 Thus, under this theory, the phrase,
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“horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, or any other barnyard animal, the general language any other
barnyard animal—despite its seeming breadth—would probably be held as applying only to fourlegged, hoofed mammals.”162
Thus, under this analysis, the Appeals Chamber holding in Tadic is incorrect. As Article
41 lists the only acceptable methods that the UNSC may consider where a threat to the peace
exists, the “general phrase that the Council may choose what non-military means can be used to
effectuate the ends of its decisions, while seemingly limitless, should have been construed to
include only measures of the same kind as the listed measures (interruptions to economic,
political, or communicative ties).”163 Under this analysis, the establishment of a judicial entity
by the Security Council is an improper extension of power. However, in light of this purported
illegality, the overwhelming value of and need for such a chamber as the ICTY far outweighs the
possible criticisms on technicalities.
Applying this standard to the current discussion would suggest that any discourse about
the technicalities of events preceding the much needed IHT, such as the specific legality of the
war, is a “red herring,” as the clear value of the IHT far outweighs any such complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above discussed reasons, the defense lacks grounds for the objections that the
IHT is illegal as a “consequence of an illegal action.” First, under principles of preemptive selfdefense, the U.S.-led coalition was fully within its legal right to engage militarily in Iraq. Also,
under the panoply of Security Council Resolutions which had been repeatedly violated by Iraq,
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the Hussein government was in “material breach” and as such the international community was
duty-bound to coerce compliance.
Secondly, accepting, arguendo, that the Iraq War was illegal, such a holding fails for a
lack of connection to the IHT. The Iraqi High Tribunal is not a “consequence of an illegal
action” or “spoils of war,” because the warring power (the U.S.-led coalition) is a different entity
than that running the Iraqi High Tribunal. Rather, the Iraqi people operate the IHT, and thus the
IHT differs from a situation where a warring power entered a sovereign state and then reaped
some explicit “spoils of war” for themselves. Further, negating the defense arguments of a
connection between the Iraq War and the IHT, the minor influence of the U.S.-led CPA in the
establishment of the IHT is not merely justified, but rather mandated under the “laws of
occupation.” Under these principles the newly established governing power was duty-bound to
establish infrastructure in the newly occupied country, one facet of which is a judicial body.
Lastly, under the international law doctrine of efficient breach, a territorial infraction of
another nation’s sovereignty is permissible when such an action is minor in relation to the
violations sought to be remedied, and aimed at eliminating the continued rule of a dangerous
threat to international peace. As such, under the doctrine of efficient breach the U.S. was
justified in leading a coalition into Iraq to remove Hussein from power, leading then to the
wholly legal and justified establishment of the IHT.
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